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BLOW THE WHISTLE AT YOUR OWN RISK: ERISA’S 
RETALIATION PROVISION AND THE DILEMMA OF THE 
“UNSOLICITED INTERNAL COMPLAINT” 
INTRODUCTION 
The first decade of the new millennium was witness to a plethora of 
corporate scandals that shook consumer confidence in big business.  Beginning 
with the Enron scandal in 2001 and culminating with the “Great Recession” in 
2008, companies and banks that generated an enormous amount of wealth 
during the 1990s became intoxicated by their success and that hubris led to 
their eventual downfall.  Critics claimed they were undone by their own 
irresponsibility and greed, as they were obsessed with the amount of wealth 
they had generated during the Internet boom.1  A common theme among these 
scandals, however, is that whistleblowers played a pivotal role by shedding 
light on the corruption that had taken root within their respective companies.  
Forbes magazine noted that the first two years of the new millennium saw an 
“avalanche of corporate accounting scandals,” documenting more than twenty 
companies that were exposed, often by whistleblowers, for accounting fraud 
alone.2  With confidence in these institutions shattered, these whistleblowers 
were viewed as white knights doing their civic duty by exposing corporate 
malfeasance.  In the wake of their success, they were hailed by many for their 
virtue and lauded for their courage by putting their careers on the line by doing 
what they believed was right.3 
In fact, whistleblowers have become so valued that in the aftermath of the 
Ponzi schemes of Bernie Madoff and Allen Stanford,4 the Securities and 
Exchange Commission is looking outside of the agency and actively consulting 
 
 1. See WAYNE VISSER, THE AGE OF RESPONSIBILITY: CSR 2.0 AND THE NEW DNA OF 
BUSINESS 32 (2011). 
 2. Penelope Patsuris, The Corporate Scandal Sheet, FORBES.COM (Aug. 26, 2002, 5:30 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/2002/07/25/accountingtracker.html.  Time magazine recognized 
“The Whistleblowers,” Cynthia Cooper, Coleen Rowley, and Sherron Watkins, as their “Persons 
of the Year 2002” for their role in revealing corruption at WorldCom, the FBI, and Enron 
respectively.  Richard Lacayo & Amanda Ripley, Persons of the Year: Cynthia Cooper, Coleen 
Rowley and Sherron Watkins, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002, at 30. 
 3. Lacayo & Ripley, supra note 2. 
 4. See Zachary A. Goldfarb & Anita Kumar, Billionaire Stanford Charged With Running 
$7 Billion Ponzi Scheme, WASH. POST, Jun. 20, 2009, at A11; Martha Graybow, Madoff 
Mysteries Remain As He Nears Guilty Plea, REUTERS, Mar. 11, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2009/03/11/us-madoff-idUSTRE52A5JK20090311. 
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with whistleblowers in order to root out instances of fraud.5  Congress has been 
proactive as well, passing the Public Company Accounting Reform and 
Corporate Responsibility Act,6 colloquially known as Sarbanes-Oxley, which 
includes a provision aimed at protecting whistleblowers.7  Section 806(a) of 
this act, entitled “Whistleblower Protection for Employees of Publicly Traded 
Companies,” prevents an employer from “discharg[ing], demot[ing], 
suspend[ing], threaten[ing], harass[ing], or in any other manner 
discriminat[ing] against an employee in the terms and conditions of 
employment because of any lawful act done by the employee . . . .”8  With 
these provisions, Congress has recognized that retaliation can have a 
“devastating ‘chilling’ effect” on those who might come forward to blow the 
whistle9 which, as the SEC also realized, is often the most effective and 
necessary way to ensure that these laws are enforced.10 
While corporate scandal served as the impetus to embody whistleblower 
protection in Sarbanes-Oxley, this was not the first or last time that Congress 
would seek to prevent employees from blowing the whistle on the impropriety 
of their employers.  Embodied in the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) is Section 510, which is colloquially known as 
ERISA’s anti-retaliation provision.11  It states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge . . . a participant or beneficiary 
for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an 
employee benefit plan, [or] this subchapter . . . or for the purpose of interfering 
with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled 
under the plan, [or] this subchapter . . . .  It shall be unlawful for any person to 
discharge, fine, suspend, expel, or discriminate against any person because he 
has given information or has testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or 
proceeding relating to this chapter or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure 
Act.12 
 
 5. Robert Chew, Calling All Whistleblowers! The SEC Wants You, TIME, Feb. 24, 2009, 
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1881318,00.html; Press Release, SEC, SEC 
Revamping Process for Reviewing Whistleblower Complaints and Enforcement Tips (Mar. 5, 
2009). 
 6. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 7201–7266 (2006)). 
 7. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why 
Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 75 (2007). 
 10. Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court’s Antiretaliation Principle, 61 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 375, 437 (2010). 
 11. See Cristin Schmitz, No ERISA Whistleblower Protection for Unsolicited Internal 
Complaints, INSIDE COUNSEL, Sept. 2010, at 74. 
 12. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006). 
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The purpose of ERISA is to protect employee benefit plans, including 
pension plans and welfare plans, and ensure that plan fiduciaries do not misuse 
plan assets.13  Currently, however, federal courts are divided over whether 
Section 510 protects an employee’s unsolicited complaints regarding whether 
or not a plan governed by ERISA is being mismanaged.14  The controversy 
stems from the language of the act, which states that it is unlawful to retaliate 
against an employee “because he has given information or has testified or is 
about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding.”15  The Second, Third, and 
Fourth Circuits have read the statute narrowly so that an employee who takes 
the initiative and tries to blow the whistle by complaining to his or her 
employer about possible ERISA violations has not participated in an “inquiry 
or proceeding” and is therefore not protected from retaliation.16  Meanwhile, 
the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have read the provision much more broadly to 
extend protection to these individuals.17  In light of the value that our society 
and government place on these individuals, it is strange that Congress would 
draft a provision that affects so many millions of people and yet fails to 
provide adequate protection to whistleblowers.  This is an issue with enormous 
public policy implications that may very well find its way to the Supreme 
Court because of the millions of Americans who are affected by ERISA.18 
In Part I of this Article, I will provide a brief summary of the purpose and 
functions of ERISA, followed by an analysis of how the five courts in question 
have ruled on this issue in Part II.  In Part III, I will examine how the outcome 
of a judicial inquiry into the matter will vary depending upon whether one 
employs a textualist or purposivist analysis.  Finally in Part IV, I will examine 
how the Supreme Court may address this issue when, and if, they are 
confronted with it based on their current makeup and their past decisions 
involving retaliation cases.  I conclude by arguing that the Court should affirm 
the decisions of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits and read into the statute broader 
protection for whistleblowers.  Furthermore, it is quite likely that the Court 
 
 13. Andrew M. Campbell, Annotation, Construction and Application of Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001 et seq.) by United States Supreme 
Court, 150 A.L.R. FED. 441, 455, 459 (1998). 
 14. Schmitz, supra note 11, at 74. 
 15. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (emphasis added). 
 16. See Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2010); Nicolaou v. 
Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, 330 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding a meeting, called by the 
company’s attorney, between the whistleblower and the president of the company was protected 
and noting that the holding was not contrary to King v. Marriott International, Inc.); King v. 
Marriott Int’l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2003); infra Part II.A–B. 
 17. See Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 11 F.2d 1311, 1315 (5th Cir. 1994); Hashimoto 
v. Bank of Haw., 999 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 18. The Supreme Court refused to address this issue in March of 2011 when it denied a 
petition for writ of certiorari in the Edwards case.  See Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 131 
S. Ct. 1604 (2011) (mem.). 
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will rule this way because of its longstanding adherence to what Richard 
Moberly calls the “anti-retaliation” principle.19  This may seem to be a rather 
controversial position because the Roberts Court’s record on employee rights 
can only be described as “mixed” at best.20  Nevertheless, it will become clear 
that in retaliation cases, the Court generally takes a purposivist approach in 
order to provide adequate protection for whistleblowers, who it views as 
playing a critical role in the enforcement of the nation’s laws.21 
I.  ERISA AND EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 
ERISA is an enormous piece of legislation and several law schools offer 
entire classes dedicated to unraveling its prolixity.22  Quite simply, it was 
Congress’s attempt to “devise a comprehensive regulatory program to protect 
millions of American workers who looked to private pension plans for 
financial support in their retirement years.”23  According to the Supreme Court 
in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, “[ERISA] imposes participation, funding, and 
vesting requirements on pension plans.  It also sets various uniform standards, 
including rules concerning reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary responsibility, 
for both pension and welfare plans.”24  As a result of its various requirements, 
ERISA has been described as “landmark legislation” that “recast the federal 
government’s role in the private pension system.”25  Before ERISA, federal 
law only indirectly affected pension plans through tax and labor laws, and 
treated pensions as merely a tool for managing workers.26  ERISA, however, 
reflected an ideological shift to the “worker-security theory,” in which the 
“purpose of a pension plan is to promote employee welfare.”27  To accomplish 
this, Congress devised minimum standards in order to ensure that workers’ 
 
 19. See Moberly, supra note 10, at 380. 
 20. Id. at 380. 
 21. See id. at 378–79. 
 22. For example, Saint Louis University School of Law regularly offers a seminar devoted to 
examining ERISA. Certificate in Employment Law, SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, 
http://law.slu.edu/emplaw/certificate.html (last visited June 28, 2011).  Harvard Law School 
offers a course entitled “Executive Compensation, ERISA, and Related Topics,” and Boston 
University School of Law offers a course entitled “Employee Benefits (ERISA).”  Executive 
Compensation, ERISA, and Related Topics, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, http://www.law.harvard. 
edu/academics/courses/2009-10/?id=7037 (last visited June 28, 2011); JD790 Employee Benefit 
Plans, BOSTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, http://www.bu.edu/law/courses/jd790.shtml (last 
visited June 28, 2011). 
 23. JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: A 
POLITICAL HISTORY 1 (2004). 
 24. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1983) (internal citations omitted). 
 25. WOOTEN, supra note 23, at 1, 3. 
 26. Id. at 4. 
 27. Id. 
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pension and health plans were not mishandled by their employer.28  These 
include minimum vesting standards that guarantee an employee’s right to the 
benefits of his or her pension after a “statutorily specified period of service,” as 
well as minimum funding standards that require the employer to ensure that the 
plans are properly funded.29 
To better understand how ERISA functions, it is important to identify the 
primary actors governed by the law.  These include the plan participants and 
beneficiaries, the plan sponsor, plan administrator, and the plan fiduciary.30  
The participants consist of employees or former employees,31 while the 
beneficiaries include non-employees, designated by the participants, who may 
be entitled to a benefit.32  The plan sponsor, generally the employer, is 
responsible for ensuring that the plan remains adequately funded by making 
contributions of amounts at least equal to the pension liabilities.33  Next, the 
plan administrator is tasked with executing the formalities of the plan.34  His or 
her responsibilities include, but are not limited to, complying with statutory 
disclosure requirements and providing information to plan participants and 
beneficiaries.35  The plan administrator is usually specifically designated under 
the “terms of the instrument,” though if such person is not designated, the plan 
sponsor typically becomes the administrator.36  Finally, there is the plan 
fiduciary who is defined in Section (21)(A),37 and who is tasked with 
managing the assets in the plan.38  There are three categories of fiduciary 
functions under this section: (1) persons who have discretionary authority over 
administration and management of the plan; (2) persons who have authority 
over assets of the plan; and (3) persons who render investment advice 
concerning assets held by the plan for compensation.39 
Once the roles these individuals play has been established, their basic 
functions are clearly defined.  Section 402(a) asserts that the plan must be 
established in a plan document or “written instrument” so that an employee is 
aware of his rights and obligations as well as the roles that the plan sponsor 
 
 28. Id. at 5. 
 29. Id. 
 30. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(16), 1102(a)(2) (2006). 
 31. Id. § 1002(7). 
 32. Id. § 1002(8). 
 33. Emily Adams, Protecting America’s Financial Future: Why Courts Should Enforce 
ERISA’s Duties of Prudence and Disclosure, 26 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 345, 348 (2011). 
 34. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A). 
 35. Adams, supra note 33, at 350. 
 36. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A). 
 37. Id. § 1002(21)(A). 
 38. See Meeting Your Fiduciary Responsibilities, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol. 
gov/ebsa/publications/fiduciaryresponsibility.html (last visited July 20, 2011). 
 39. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). 
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and administrator perform.40  Moreover, Section 103(a) requires the plan 
sponsor to prepare and file with the Department of Labor an annual report for 
each employee benefit plan that is subject to ERISA, as well as a summary 
annual report (“SAR”) which includes a basic financial statement, a description 
of the minimum funding standards for the plan, and a statement of the 
participant’s right to additional information.41  Finally, Section 105 requires 
the plan administrator to provide a periodic benefit statement to each 
participant describing the value of his or her total accrued benefit under the 
pension plan and the non-forfeitable portion of that benefit.42 
Controversy arises because the employer often wears multiple hats and 
serves as both the plan administrator and fiduciary.  This is best illustrated by 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, a 1989 Supreme Court case in which 
employees of Firestone brought suit against their employer for severance 
benefits under ERISA.43  In that case, the employer not only administered the 
benefit plan, but also evaluated claims and paid for benefits.44  While this is 
completely legal, it still creates numerous problems, as the Third Circuit noted 
when it was confronted with the Firestone case.45  In the court’s words, “every 
dollar provided in benefits is a dollar spent by . . . the employer; and every 
dollar saved . . . is a dollar in [the employer’s] pocket.”46  It is clear then that 
the employer often does not have the proper incentives to ensure that the plan 
is properly funded and maintained. 
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court touched on this issue more recently in the 
2008 case of Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Glenn.47  The case 
involved Wanda Glenn, a plan participant, who brought suit against 
Metropolitan Life Insurance (“MetLife”), the plan administrator, for 
terminating her long-term disability benefits on the grounds that she was no 
longer totally disabled.48  The Court held that when determining whether the 
plan administrator has abused its discretion in denying benefits, a reviewing 
court must consider the conflict of interest arising from the dual role of an 
entity as an ERISA plan administrator and as a payer of plan benefits.49  In 
particular the Court noted that: 
The employer’s fiduciary interest may counsel in favor of granting a borderline 
claim while its immediate financial interest counsels to the contrary.  Thus, the 
 
 40. 29 U.S.C. § 1102. 
 41. Id. § 1023. 
 42. Id. § 1025. 
 43. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 105 (1989). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134, 136 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 46. Id. at 144. 
 47. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 108 (2008). 
 48. Id. at 109–10. 
 49. Id. at 111–12. 
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employer has an “interest . . . conflicting with that of the beneficiaries,” the 
type of conflict that judges must take into account when they review the 
discretionary acts of a trustee of a common-law trust.50 
In light of the fact that the employer often has a conflict of interest and 
does not necessarily put the concerns of his employees first, Section 510, the 
retaliation provision, takes on a greater importance.  Justice O’Connor, writing 
for the majority in Inter-Modal Rail Employees Association v. Atchison, 
Topeka, & Santa Fe Railway Co. was also sensitive to the fact that an 
employer might not always have the employee’s best interests in mind when 
she wrote that employers “are free to reduce benefits should economic 
conditions sour.”51  Section 510, however, by protecting an employee from an 
employer who unlawfully interferes with his or her rights, “helps to make [an 
employer’s] promises [under ERISA] credible.”52  In one sense, Section 510 is 
the glue that holds the legislation together.  It establishes a “shifting burden 
analysis,” which requires the plaintiff to “first establish a prima facie case by 
showing: 1) prohibited employer conduct, i.e., discharge, fine, suspension, 
expulsion, discipline or discrimination, 2) taken for the purpose of interfering 
3) with the attainment of any right to which the employee may become entitled 
4) under the provisions of an ERISA employee benefit plan.”53  If the plaintiff 
satisfies this burden, the employer must then “articulate a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action” in order to avoid 
liability.54  If the employer is able to carry its burden, “the plaintiff then must 
persuade the court by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s 
legitimate reason is pretextual.”55  The problem originates in the last clause of 
the statute, which states that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, 
fine, suspend, expel, or discriminate against any person because he has given 
information or has testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or 
proceeding.”56  The question that the Supreme Court may eventually be 
confronted with is what constitutes an “inquiry or proceeding” and whether or 
not an employee actually participated in one. 
 
 50. Id. at 112. 
 51. Inter-Modal Rail Emps. Ass’n v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 U.S. 510, 
515 (1997). 
 52. Id. (citing Heath v. Varity Corp., 71 F.3d 256, 258 (7th Cir. 1995)). 
 53. Kenni B. Merritt, Interference with ERISA-Protected Rights: Making a Federal Case 
Out of a Wrongful Discharge Action, 77 OKLA. B.J. 873, 874 (2006). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
338 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:331 
II.  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
As previously noted, five circuits have ruled on whether or not Section 510 
protects from retaliation those employees who make “unsolicited internal 
complaints,” or in other words, those employees who “blow the whistle” by 
notifying their employer of a potential ERISA violation on their own accord.57  
The three circuits that have ruled in the negative have adhered closely to the 
meaning of the text and construed it narrowly so that an employee who comes 
forward on his or her own is not engaging in protected activity.58  Meanwhile, 
the three circuits that held that unsolicited complaints are protected were more 
concerned with the policy ramifications and considered how Section 510 
would be eviscerated if whistleblowers were not given sanctuary under the 
law.59 
A. The Fourth and Second Circuits Hold Unsolicited Internal Complaints 
are Not Protected by Section 510 
King v. Marriott International, Inc., decided by the Fourth Circuit in 2003, 
was the first time in which a court ruled that an employee’s unsolicited internal 
complaints were not protected by Section 510, though it would not be the 
last.60  In that case, Karen King, a long time employee of Marriott who worked 
in their benefits department, became cognizant of several possible ERISA 
violations by management.61  In 1999, she became aware of the fact that Karl I. 
Fredericks, Senior Vice President of Compensation and Benefits, 
recommended that the company transfer millions of dollars from its medical 
plan into the general corporate reserve account in violation of ERISA 
regulations.62  At that time, King voiced her concern to Fredericks and nothing 
came of his proposal.63  Later in the year, King was promoted by Fredericks 
and was put in charge of benefit plan finances.64  When Fredericks again 
proposed the transfer of the funds, she again complained to him as well as to 
two in-house attorneys.65  Finally, the following year the company proposed 
 
 57. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text. 
 58. Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 218 (3d Cir. 2010); Nicolaou v. 
Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, 330 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that a meeting, called by the 
company’s attorney, between the whistleblower and the president of the company was protected 
and noting that the holding was not contrary to King v. Marriott International, Inc.); King v. 
Marriott Int’l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427–28 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 59. Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1311, 1314 (5th Cir. 1994); Hashimoto v. 
Bank of Haw., 999 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 60. King, 337 F.3d at 427–28; see, e.g., Edwards, 610 F.3d at 218. 
 61. King, 337 F.3d at 423. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2011] BLOW THE WHISTLE AT YOUR OWN RISK 339 
another transfer of funds from the medical plan and King blew the whistle by 
objecting verbally and in writing to Fredericks.66  He responded by terminating 
her employment claiming that it was due to her inability to coexist and share 
responsibilities with another co-worker.67 
King brought suit in Maryland state court alleging that her termination was 
in violation of Section 510, but the district court granted summary judgment to 
Marriott.68  On appeal, the Fourth Circuit turned to the issue of whether or not 
Section 510 protected the unsolicited internal complaints made by King.69  The 
court began its analysis by turning to the statute and determining that the only 
relevant provision applicable to King was the portion that read, “[i]t shall be 
unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, or discriminate 
against  any person because he has given information or has testified or is 
about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding relating to this chapter.”70 
The principle issue for the court was determining the appropriate scope of 
the phrase “inquiry or proceeding.”71  In order to solve this problem, the court 
turned to its decision in Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., which involved an 
interpretation of the retaliation provision in the Fair Labor Standards Act.72  In 
that case, the primary issue also hinged on the meaning of the term 
“proceeding.”73  The Fourth Circuit concluded that “proceeding” in the context 
of the Fair Labor Standards Act “referred only to administrative or legal 
proceedings, and not to the making of an intra-company complaint.”74  
Furthermore, the court examined the phrase “testified or is about to testify” and 
determined that it suggests that the phrase “inquir[y] or proceeding[]” “is 
limited to the legal or administrative, or at least to something more formal than 
written or oral complaints made to a supervisor.”75  As a result, the court easily 
disposed of King’s claim because her complaints never occurred in the context 
of a legal or administrative proceeding.76  Therefore, they concluded that 
Section 510 did not protect her unsolicited internal complaint.77 
Two years later, the Second Circuit was faced with the same issue in 
Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc.78  In that case, the plaintiff, Chrystina 
 
 66. King, 337 F.3d at 423. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 423–24. 
 69. Id. at 426–27. 
 70. Id. at 427 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1140). 
 71. King, 337 F.3d at 427. 
 72. Id. (citing Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., 228 F.3d 360, 364 (4th Cir. 2000)). 
 73. Id. (citing Ball, 228 F.3d at 364). 
 74. Id. (citing Ball, 228 F.3d at 364). 
 75. Id. 
 76. King, 337 F.3d at 427–28. 
 77. Id. at 428. 
 78. Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, 328–30 (2d Cir. 2005). 
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Nicolaou, was hired by Horizon Media, Inc. to serve as its Director of Human 
Resources and Administration.79  As part of her duties she served as the 
fiduciary and trustee of Horizon’s 401(k) employee benefits plan.80  Nicolaou 
soon found out that the 401(k) was being mismanaged and “discovered a 
serious payroll discrepancy involving underpayment of overtime to all non-
exempt employees of the [New York City] and Los Angeles offices.”81  
Nicolaou attempted to blow the whistle by registering a complaint with 
Horizon’s Chief Financial Officer, Jerry Riley.82  When he refused to take 
action, she turned to Stewart Linder, Horizon’s Controller, who also dismissed 
her complaint.83  Nicolaou did not yield, however, and contacted Mark 
Silverman, an attorney for Horizon.84  After looking into the matter, he also 
found that there was a massive payroll discrepancy.85  Nicolaou and Silverman 
proceeded to meet with William Koenigsberg, the President of Horizon, to 
implore him to rectify the problem.86  Shortly thereafter, Nicolaou was 
demoted to Office Manager by Koenigsberg and eventually terminated.87  
Nicolaou sued Horizon alleging her termination was in violation of Section 
510 of ERISA, but the district court granted Horizon’s motion to dismiss 
contending that Section 510 “does not protect an employee who participates in 
an internal inquiry.”88 
Like the Fourth Circuit before it, the Second Circuit focused on the 
language of Section 510 and whether or not Nicolaou participated in an 
“inquiry or proceeding” when she met with Koenigsberg.89  The Second 
Circuit also looked at the plain meaning of the statute and applied the Black’s 
Law Dictionary definition of the terms “inquiry” and “proceeding.”90  
Accordingly, an “inquiry” was determined to be “any request for 
information”91 while a “proceeding” referred to the “progression of a lawsuit 
or other business before a court, agency, or other official body.”92  The Second 
Circuit’s analysis varied from the Fourth Circuit’s, however, by including an 
“informal gathering of information” within the umbrella of an “inquiry.”93  As 
 
 79. Id. at 326. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 326. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 326–27. 
 88. Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 327. 
 89. Id. at 328. 
 90. Id. at 329. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 329. 
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a result, their standard for what constituted an inquiry was broader, and an oral 
complaint, like the one Nicolaou made to Koenigsberg, qualified as a “request 
for information.”94  This put the court slightly at odds with the Fourth Circuit 
which had defined “inquiry” as reaching only “the legal or administrative, or at 
least . . . something more formal than written or oral complaints made to a 
supervisor.”95  Nevertheless, the court stated that its holding was not contrary 
to the Fourth Circuit’s decision,96 suggesting that when confronted with an 
unsolicited complaint, as in King, the Second Circuit would follow suit and 
find an unsolicited complaint outside the statutory meaning of “inquiry.”  
Thus, if “Nicolaou [could] demonstrate that she was contacted to meet with 
Koenigsberg in order to give information about the alleged underfunding of the 
Plan, her actions would fall within the protection of Section 510.”97  On 
remand, this left Nicolaou with the burden of proving that her complaint was 
solicited by management.98 
B. The Third Circuit’s Decision 
Most recently, in 2010, the Third Circuit was confronted with this issue in 
Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc. when it concurred with the Second and 
Fourth Circuits.99  This is, perhaps, the most important of the three opinions to 
hold that unsolicited internal complaints are not protected because the court 
provided the most extensive analysis.  It also contains a spirited dissent that 
perfectly encapsulates how the majority’s reading eviscerates the purpose of 
the retaliation provision.100 
In 2006, Shirley Edwards was hired to run the human resources department 
for A.H. Cornell and Son, Inc., a family owned business.101  Like many other 
employees at the company, Edwards participated in a group health insurance 
plan which was provided by her employer and governed by ERISA.102  By 
early 2009, Edwards became aware of the fact that her employer had been 
mismanaging the health insurance plan.103  Edwards, in an attempt to blow the 
whistle, approached management and informed them of the numerous 
violations, including: administering the group health plan on a discriminatory 
basis, misrepresenting to some employees the cost of insurance to dissuade 
them from opting in, and even enrolling non-citizens in its ERISA plans by 
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providing false social security numbers to its insurer.104  Shortly thereafter 
Edwards was terminated.105  She promptly filed suit against A.H. Cornell in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging 
an anti-retaliation claim under Section 510 of ERISA and a common law 
wrongful discharge claim.106  However, the defendant’s motion to dismiss was 
granted, because Edwards’s “objections and/or complaints to management 
were not part of an ‘inquiry or proceeding.’”107  The court stated: 
Plaintiff does not allege that anyone requested information from her or 
initiated contact with her in any way regarding the alleged ERISA violations.  
Nor does she allege that she was involved in any type of formal or informal 
gathering of information.  She states merely that she objected to or complained 
about certain conduct by Defendants.108 
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the trial court by a 2-1 vote.109  The 
court began its analysis by examining the plain meaning of the statute’s text.110  
By applying this textual approach, the court noted that “absent a clearly 
expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be 
regarded as conclusive.”111  The court agreed that Edwards “undoubtedly 
[gave] information by objecting and/or complaining to management,” so the 
only issue was whether or not it was part of an “inquiry or proceeding.”112  
Like the Second Circuit before it, the court applied the Black’s Law Dictionary 
definition of “inquiry”—a request for information—and held that no one 
approached Edwards requesting information regarding ERISA violations in 
this case.113  The court also determined that Edwards’s actions were not part of 
a “proceeding.”114  Again turning to the dictionary definition, they found that a 
“proceeding” is “‘the regular and orderly progression of a lawsuit’ or the 
‘procedural means for seeking redress from a tribunal or agency.’”115  The 
court concluded that “there is no suggestion that any such formal action ha[d] 
occurred.”116  As a result, the court dispensed with the case by finding that 
Section 510 does not protect unsolicited internal complaints because the text is 
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plain and unambiguous in its assertion that a complaint must occur within an 
“inquiry or proceeding.”117 
Judge Cowen, writing for the dissent, made a vigorous argument that 
“ERISA’s anti-retaliation provision does indeed protect ‘an employee’s 
unsolicited internal complaints to management’” and that the majority’s 
interpretation eviscerated many of the protections afforded by the statute.118  
Moreover, he argued that it was “difficult to believe that Congress could have 
ever intended to exclude from the protection of its remedial anti-retaliation 
provision employees who are terminated because they bring an ERISA-related 
problem to the attention of their superiors.”119  Thus, he dissented from their 
narrow interpretation of the statute.120 
Judge Cowen began his dissent by agreeing that an interpretation of the 
statute must begin with the statutory language and a determination as to 
whether the language has “a plain and unambiguous meaning.”121  This is 
where Judge Cowen parted with his colleagues, however, as he did not concur 
in their conclusion that the language was plain and unambiguous.  Citing 
relevant Pennsylvania case law, Judge Cowen deftly argued that the term 
“proceeding” is indeed ambiguous.122  He relied on Passaic Valley Sewerage 
Commissioners v. United States Department of Labor, which held that “the 
statutory term ‘proceeding’ . . . is ‘ambiguous’ because it ‘may reasonably be 
invoked to encompass a range of complaint activity of varying degrees of 
formal legal status.’”123  Moreover, Judge Cowen also believed that the 
majority interpreted the word “inquiry” too narrowly and that it was also open 
to ambiguity.124  Often, the first step in an “inquiry” is the unsolicited 
complaint made by a whistleblower.  As Judge Cowen noted, “an internal 
workplace complaint would quite naturally constitute a preliminary step before 
a formal or informal inquiry is launched (and such a complaint may even have 
been necessary to trigger the investigation in the first place).”125  Thus, by 
construing the statute narrowly, Section 510 would leave this “crucial ‘first 
step’ unprotected.”126 
Judge Cowen concluded the issue of ambiguity by arguing that it can be 
incredibly difficult to draw the line between this initial first step and protected 
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statements that are actually made as a part of an official inquiry.127  To 
illustrate this point, Judge Cowen posed the hypothetical situation of an 
employee that complains to his or her supervisor, who then responds with 
follow-up questions.128  The question then is whether or not this informal 
conversation rises to the level of an “inquiry” so that the statements are 
protected.129  Finally, he noted that the majority’s interpretation only protects 
employees who give information as part of an inquiry and not those who 
conduct the inquiry and “thereby ‘receive[] information.’”130  Therefore, 
according to Judge Cowen, the majority’s application essentially renders the 
bulk of the statute impotent as it no longer applies to employees who complain 
to management on their own volition, as well as those in charge of soliciting 
information in a proceeding or inquiry.131 
C. The Fifth and Ninth Circuits Hold that Unsolicited Internal Complaints 
are Protected by Section 510 
The first court to hold that an employee’s unsolicited internal complaints 
are protected by ERISA’s anti-retaliation provision was the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in the 1993 case of Hashimoto v. Bank of Hawaii.132  Jessica 
Hashimoto was an employee at the Bank of Hawaii when she complained to 
her supervisors about possible “violations by the Bank of the reporting and 
disclosure requirements and fiduciary standards of ERISA.”133  The same 
supervisors had requested that she “reimburse a former employee from a 
profit-sharing plan for taxes that [she] ‘had properly withheld’” from the 
employee’s account.134  She also contended that she was told “to recalculate a 
former employee’s pension plan benefit and to use final pay, not final average 
pay,” which was a violation of ERISA.135  Hashimoto refused and was 
terminated shortly thereafter.136  She filed suit in Hawaii state court alleging 
wrongful termination in violation of the Hawaii Whistle Blower’s Protection 
Act.137  The case was removed to the United States District Court for the 
District of Hawaii where summary judgment was entered in favor of her 
employer because her claims were preempted by ERISA.138  On appeal, 
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Hashimoto contended that her discharge was in retaliation for the complaints 
she made as to possible ERISA violations involving the bank’s profit-sharing 
plan, pension plan, and severance plan.139 
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by examining the language of the 
retaliation provision and then quickly moving beyond it to examine the 
purpose of the legislation.140  Noting that ERISA “provides a remedy for a 
fiduciary who is discharged because she ‘has given information or has testified 
or is about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding relating to [ERISA],’” the 
court stated that the purpose of the statute is “clearly meant to protect whistle 
blowers.”141  Moreover, the court determined that the provision “may be fairly 
construed to protect a person in Hashimoto’s position.”142  Unlike the Second, 
Third and Fourth Circuits, the Ninth Circuit seemed to be acutely aware of the 
role that whistleblowers play in exposing ERISA violations.  Where the 
previous courts stopped short at the text of the statute, the Ninth Circuit 
examined the role that the plaintiff performed and how her interests could be 
promoted by the statute.143  The court viewed the plaintiff not as a lone 
employee who happened to stumble upon an isolated instance of corruption, 
but as a member of a larger fraternity of whistleblowers whose rights needed to 
be vindicated.144  Thus, the court paid more attention to the purpose of the act 
and how its goals could best be achieved.  This is not to say, however, that it 
completely ignored the text of the statute.  It, too, examined the terms “inquiry 
and proceeding” but also felt it was necessary to read between the lines.145  For 
example, the court agreed with Judge Cowen that “[t]he normal first step in 
giving information or testifying in any way that might tempt an employer to 
discharge one would be to present the problem first to the responsible 
managers of the ERISA plan.”146  Therefore, the court interpreted the statute 
broadly in order to come to the conclusion that an employee who lodges 
unsolicited complaints is protected by the statute.147  This furthered the interest 
of the employee as a whistleblower and seemed to be in accord with the 
statute’s goal of preventing retaliation. 
A year later, the Fifth Circuit joined the Ninth Circuit by also holding that 
Section 510 protects an employee’s unsolicited internal complaints in the case 
of Anderson v. Electronic Data Systems Corp.148  This case involved an 
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employee of Electronic Data Systems (“EDS”) who worked as a manger in the 
Domestic Treasury Department.149  The plaintiff contended that he was 
demoted and discharged for refusing to commit illegal acts, several of which 
were in violation of ERISA.150  He was not only asked to approve payment 
invoices on behalf of pension portfolios under his management and supervision 
without the approval of the pension trustees, but was also asked to draft 
minutes of meetings relating to the EDS Retirement Plan of which he was not 
present.151 
In its discussion, the court did not delve into the same kind of in-depth 
analysis as to whether Anderson was protected by the retaliation provision.  In 
fact, it did not even devote an entire paragraph to the retaliation issue, nor did 
it even touch on the language of the statute like every other circuit that has 
ruled on this issue.152  The court simply noted that Section 510 “broadly 
prohibits the termination or other adverse treatment of participants.”153  By its 
silence, however, one can infer that the court shared the sentiments of the 
Hashimoto court in that it did not feel the text of the statute was as crucial as 
its purpose, and thus it did not even warrant an examination.  Essentially, the 
Anderson court reached the same decision as the Ninth Circuit in Hashimoto 
by resting its conclusion on the fact that since the purpose of Section 510 was 
to protect employees from retaliation, then it should naturally be construed to 
protect the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not his complaints were 
solicited.154 
III.  ANALYSIS OF THE COURTS’ DECISIONS 
With an almost even split among the circuits as to whether or not Section 
510 protects employees who lodge unsolicited internal complaints, this issue is 
ripe for Supreme Court review.  At first glance, it seems foolish that Congress 
would draft a provision meant to protect employees from retaliation, and yet 
purposely intend for it not to protect an entire class of individuals who make 
unsolicited complaints.  Judge Cowen was of a similar opinion when he wrote 
in his dissent in Edwards that he found it “difficult to believe that Congress 
could have ever intended to exclude from the protection of its remedial anti-
retaliation provision employees who are terminated because they bring an 
ERISA-related problem to the attention of their superiors.”155  After a close 
reading of the language of the statute as well as a comparison to other 
 
 149. Id. at 1312. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 1315. 
 153. Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1315. 
 154. See id. 
 155. Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 227 (3d Cir. 2010). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2011] BLOW THE WHISTLE AT YOUR OWN RISK 347 
retaliation provisions, one can easily see how courts have reached this 
conclusion.  For example, Section 215(a)(3) of the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA) makes it unlawful for an employer: 
[T]o discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee 
because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be 
instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter, or has testified or is 
about to testify in any such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an 
industry committee.156 
Here it is readily apparent that Congress intended to give whistleblowers broad 
protection.  It does not limit itself to cases in which an employee “has given 
information” or “has testified” in an “inquiry or proceeding.”157  Instead, any 
employee who “has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted 
any proceeding” is covered by the statute.158  Certainly, employees who initiate 
a complaint fall under the umbrella of the law. 
Meanwhile, Title VII’s retaliation provision is also substantially broader 
than Section 510.  Section 2000e-3, entitled “Other unlawful employment 
practices,” states that: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate 
against any of his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment 
agency, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or 
other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to 
discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate 
against any member thereof or applicant for membership, because he has 
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this 
subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated 
in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this 
subchapter.159 
Unlike ERISA, Congress seemed to have made a good faith attempt to cover 
its bases with Title VII by providing for almost every possible scenario in 
which an employee could lodge a complaint.  Section 2000e-3 covers 
employees who “opposed any practice made an unlawful employment 
practice.”160  It then goes on to delineate the circumstances in which they can 
oppose a practice, which include making a charge, testifying, assisting, or 
participating in “an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this 
subchapter.”161  Thus, when one compares ERISA with Title VII and FLSA, it 
seems that Congress made a concerted effort to exclude certain behavior from 
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the protection of the law, especially when one considers that previous 
legislation can serve as a template.  Nevertheless, just because Section 510 is 
much more narrowly drafted than its counterparts in the FLSA and Title VII 
does not mean that the analysis is complete. 
In order to better understand how the courts that have ruled on this matter 
came to their decision, it is helpful to examine the language of the statute using 
both textualist and purposivist interpretations.  How one reconciles the 
language of ERISA’s retaliation provision with its cousins in Title VII and 
FLSA, for example, depends upon the type of interpretation used.  Based 
strictly on a comparison of the text of the statutes, it would seem that Section 
510 is indeed far narrower and only protects complaints made as part of an 
“inquiry or proceeding.”162  Nevertheless, others would argue that this 
undermines the purpose of the legislation.  As a result, it is necessary to 
determine how the outcome of any analysis varies based on the type of analysis 
that one employs. 
A. Textualist and Purposivist Readings 
Courts have long been divided when it comes to the interpretation of 
statutes.  On the one hand, there is the rigid formalist theory known as 
textualism in which its adherents believe they “are bound by a statute’s plain 
meaning, and that consideration of legislative history, spirit, or purpose is 
inappropriate in attempting to discern statutory meaning.”163  The roots of this 
theory stretch into the nineteenth century where it grew out of the “‘plain 
meaning’ school of interpretation.”164  This theory dictates that if a writing or 
provision “appears to be unambiguous on its face, its meaning must be 
determined from the writing itself without resort to any extrinsic evidence.”165  
Adherents to the modern textualism movement believe that they are “faithful 
agents of Congress” who treat “the language of the statute as the legislative 
instructions that they are bound to follow” as opposed to a code that is meant 
to evolve over time.166  For example, when it comes to the Constitution, 
leading textualists such as the Supreme Court’s Antonin Scalia, deride those 
who describe the Constitution as a “Living Constitution” that changes with the 
times.167  Justice Scalia claims that the idea that the Constitution is a 
“morphing” document in which a judge must consider what “it ought to mean” 
is inherently flawed because it results in a process in which the Constitution is 
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written “anew.”168  More problematically, when judges are selected and 
confirmed based on their views of what the Constitution “ought to mean,” the 
Constitution risks being rewritten to reflect the majority view.169  As Scalia 
notes, the Bill of Rights will be hijacked and bent to serve the will of the 
majority, which is the very group it was meant to protect against.170  This 
theory extends far beyond analyzing the Constitution.  Justice Scalia declares 
that the rule of law is a “law of rules” and that where the text of any statute 
embodies a rule, judges are to simply apply it as law.171  There is no further 
inquiry into what Congress intended for the statute to mean or what the judge 
believes it “ought to mean.”172 
Textualism, then, appears to be the primary form of legal analysis that the 
Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits employed when they ruled that ERISA did 
not protect an employee’s unsolicited internal complaints.  In King, the court 
began its analysis by going straight to the text of the statute in order to 
determine if it was ambiguous.173  It concluded that the phrase “inquiry or 
proceeding” was plain and unambiguous and that the plaintiff had never lodged 
her complaints in a formal setting.174  As a result, the King court had no trouble 
disposing of her complaint.175  The court did not care to examine why 
Congress would pass a piece of legislation in the first place that did not protect 
whistleblowers, nor did they consider the policy ramifications of their decision 
and how it would result in a gap in the legislation that would leave an entire 
class of individuals unprotected. 
The Second Circuit in Nicolaou also neglected to consider Congress’s 
overarching purpose in enacting the statute.  Like the Fourth Circuit, the court 
heavily emphasized the text of the statute.176  It began by comparing the 
language of Section 510 with the “analogous whistleblower protections” of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which 
the district court had relied upon in holding that Nicolaou’s activity did not 
qualify as protected activity.177  While the court did discuss Congress’s intent, 
this was in regard to the language that Congress included in the text of the 
statute.  It stated that Congress sought to protect those involved in the 
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“informal gathering of information,” and that “Congress manifested such an 
intent when it chose . . . to conjoin to the term ‘proceeding’ . . . the additional 
term ‘inquiry.’”178  As a result, the court found that the language of Section 
510 was significantly broader than its counterparts because of the inclusion of 
the word “inquiry” and reversed the lower court’s decision.179  The court ended 
its analysis here, however, and did not go further and inquire why Congress 
drafted the statute and the purpose that it was meant to serve. 
The Third Circuit’s analysis in Edwards essentially followed the same 
formula.  The Edwards court began by examining the existing split of 
authority, as well as analogous decisions from its prior case law.180  It even 
went as far as to acknowledge that remedial statutes “should be liberally 
construed in favor of protecting the participants in employee benefit plans.”181  
Nevertheless, the court bypassed a weighty analysis of the purpose of the 
legislation, as well as the policy ramifications of its decision.  To the court, 
these issues were almost entirely irrelevant.182  The only thing that mattered 
was the plain meaning of the language of the text and whether or not it was 
ambiguous.183  As a result, like the Second Circuit, it also applied the plain 
meaning of the text as found in Black’s Law Dictionary and found that it was 
unambiguous.184  As a result, the court was quick to determine that Edwards 
did not participate in a proceeding or inquiry in accord with the plain meaning 
of these terms and quickly disposed of the case from there, finding that her 
termination was not protected by Section 510.185 
The common thread tying all three of these cases together is that they seem 
to abide by Justice Scalia’s belief that the rule of law is a “law of rules.”186  
These courts examined the language of the statute, defined terms that may have 
had ambiguous meanings, and determined whether or not, as written, it 
protected a whistleblower who made an unsolicited complaint.  They were 
hardly interested in Congress’s possible intent or public policy concerns unless 
they were explicitly embedded in language of the statute.  Moreover, they 
clearly did not share the concern of Judge Cowen who believed that by not 
extending protection to employees who lodged unsolicited complaints, they 
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were eviscerating Congress’s legislative intent.187  Judge Cowen seemed to 
view the issue through an entirely different lens in which he examined the 
spirit of the law.188  This method of statutory interpretation is known as 
purposivism.189 
Purposivists, like textualists, view themselves as “faithful agents of 
Congress” though they believe they have a more aggressive mandate.190  While 
textualists believe that statutes are akin to binding legislative instructions, 
purposivists generally seek to ascertain and enforce Congress’s intent as 
accurately as possible.191  Moreover, they believe that finding one true 
meaning of a statute is impossible and that the way a statute is interpreted will 
change over time.192  For example, William Eskridge, a leading critic of 
textualism, believes it is impossible to regard a statute as a static text.193  He 
explains that the notion that a statute should be interpreted in a similar manner 
as when it was originally enacted is a “dubious description of practical reality” 
and “dreary aspiration for our polity.”194  Eskridge makes the point that in our 
system of government in which there is a separation of powers, the statutory 
interpreter is necessarily a different person from the author of a statute, and he 
will not interpret a statute in a vacuum, but will bring with it his beliefs and 
worldly experiences.195  Thus, it is not only impractical but also impossible for 
judges to determine that a statute only has one correct meaning or purpose.196  
Nevertheless, while Eskridge rails against what he views as the fallibility of 
textualism, he believes in dynamic statutory interpretation as opposed to a full 
blown purposive analysis.197  The difference is that the former recognizes a 
statute will be interpreted differently depending on who reads the statute,198 
while purposivism takes it one step further and insists that statutes must be 
construed to best promote the purpose they were enacted to serve.199  Manning 
states that purposivists subscribe to the notion that: 
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Sometimes . . . the text of a particular provision will seem incongruous with 
the statutory purpose reflected in various contextual cues—such as the overall 
tenor of the statute, patterns of policy judgments made in related legislation, 
the “evil” that inspired Congress to act, or express statements found in the 
legislative history.200 
Moreover, purposivists assume that when a statute appears to be incongruous 
with its purpose, Congress must have misstated its intended meaning and that 
“a judicial faithful agent could properly adjust the enacted text to capture what 
Congress would have intended had it expressly confronted the apparent 
mismatch between text and purpose.”201  This theory has its flaws as well.  As 
Eskridge notes, it is often impossible to decipher one true purpose behind a 
statute just as it is impossible to find one true meaning.202  For example, he 
notes that legislators often have multiple purposes and a final piece of 
legislation is often a compromise between competing interests.203 
Nevertheless, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, as well as Judge Cowen in his 
dissent, certainly believed that Congress’s true purpose could be divined with 
regard to Section 510.204  Since the statute is meant to protect individuals 
against retaliation, they concluded that any individual who brings a possible 
violation to the attention of their employer should be protected.205  While the 
legislation does not specifically reveal Congress’s intent, the courts could infer 
from related legislation, such as FLSA and Title VII, that Congress intended 
Section 510 of ERISA to extend to unsolicited internal complaints.  Their 
decisions demonstrate that they subscribe to the notion that the “‘letter’ (text) 
of a statute must yield to its ‘spirit’ (purpose) when the two conflict[].”206  
Judge Cowen, in particular, was driven by his belief that the majority’s ruling 
that the statute was unambiguous was flawed.207  Quoting Third Circuit 
precedent that held the court must “avoid constructions that produce ‘odd’ or 
‘absurd results’ or that are ‘inconsistent with common sense,’”208 he found it 
“difficult to believe” that Congress actively chose to exclude employees who 
are terminated because they bring an ERISA-related problem to their 
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supervisor’s attention.209  Thus for Judge Cowen, construing Section 510 
broadly was the only way to carry out Congress’s true purpose and prevent the 
“evil” of retaliation that inspired them to act in the first place. 
One can argue that the Ninth Circuit, in Hashimoto, confronted this 
problem in the same way by examining what they believed was the 
overarching purpose of the statute.  The court stated that Section 510 “is 
clearly meant to protect whistle blowers” and that “[i]t may be fairly construed 
to protect a person in Hashimoto’s position if, in fact, she was fired because 
she was protesting a violation of law in connection with an ERISA plan.”210  
The court seemed content to rest its holding on the mere fact that since Section 
510 is a statute that protects whistleblowers, it should therefore protect 
Hashimoto, regardless of whether or not her complaints were solicited by her 
employer.211  Moreover, unlike each of the courts that ruled Section 510 does 
not protect unsolicited internal complaints, the court refused to focus on the 
text of the statute, lending more credence to the fact that the court applied a 
purposivist approach that led them to reach the opposite conclusion. 
The Fifth Circuit reached the same conclusion by approaching the situation 
through the lens of a purposivist.  To the Fifth Circuit in Anderson, the text of 
the statute was almost irrelevant.  The court stated that “ERISA § 510 broadly 
prohibits the termination or other adverse treatment of participants and 
beneficiaries . . . .”212  This completely contradicts the Second, Third, and 
Fourth Circuits, which construed the statue narrowly and determined that an 
employee was immune from retaliation only if they participated in an “inquiry 
or proceeding.”213 
What has resulted is an even circuit split in which the courts have come to 
opposite conclusions by applying different, competing types of legal analyses.  
On the one hand, the text of the statute limits protection to those employees 
who participated in an “inquiry or proceeding.”214  On the other hand, there is 
the overarching purpose of the statute, which reflects Congress’s intent to 
eradicate the “evil” of employer retaliation.  Thus, there is an incongruity that 
is ripe for Supreme Court review.  The question then is how the Court, when 
eventually confronted with this issue, will resolve this dispute. 
B. The Current Court’s Makeup and How it Might Rule on This Issue 
Since Chief Justice Roberts ascended to the bench in 2005, the Court has 
been known for being strongly conservative and composed of self-proclaimed 
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textualists such as Justice Scalia, and Justices Thomas and Kennedy who have 
indicated their inclination toward textualist interpretations.215  Justice Alito has 
also been described as an adherent to “newer textualism” in which the text of 
the statute still reigns supreme but is put into its proper context by considering 
its legislative history.216  Moreover, some scholars consider the Chief Justice to 
be an adherent to the textualist school of judicial interpretation because of his 
tendency to join in opinions with the Court’s more outspoken textualists.217 
When it comes to predicting how the Court may rule on this issue, it would 
seem to be a cut and dried case on the surface.  The Roberts Court is widely 
regarded as being pro-employer, and with up to five possible textualists on the 
Court, it would seem highly likely that they would simply construe the 
retaliation provision narrowly and affirm the decisions of Second, Third, and 
Fourth Circuits and therefore hold that the law does not protect unsolicited 
internal complaints.218  Nevertheless, when one looks at the Court’s recent 
retaliation cases, there appears to be an anomaly.  While their record on 
employee rights can be best described as “mixed,” the Court takes a much 
more favorable view toward employees when it comes to retaliation cases.219  
Richard Moberly explains that the Court takes a different approach with these 
cases because of its long-standing adherence to what he describes as the 
“Antiretaliation Principle,” which dates back more than fifty years.220 
The anti-retaliation principle rests on three assumptions: “(1) employees 
are in the best position to know about illegal conduct by their employer or 
other employees; (2) employees will report this information if the law protects 
them from employer retaliation; and (3) employee reports about misconduct 
will improve law enforcement.”221  This last assumption is the most critical, as 
Moberly contends that “for a law to be enforced . . . retaliation against those 
who report violations must be prevented.”222  Thus “law enforcement depends 
on employees blowing the whistle on illegal conduct.”223  To best effectuate 
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this, the Court has made it easier for plaintiffs to bring retaliation lawsuits 
because it has recognized “the devastating ‘chilling’ effect retaliation can have 
on” a person’s willingness to report illegal conduct.224  In order to understand 
how the Roberts Court has applied this principle in recent years, it is important 
to understand its statutory precedent. 
The 1960 case of Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc.225 dealt with 
Section 17 of FLSA, which gave the federal courts jurisdiction to enjoin 
violations of the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision.226  The primary issue was 
whether courts could go further and compel an employer to “pay damages to 
employees who were retaliated against in violation of the [a]ct.”227  While the 
language of the statute seemed to clearly limit a court to injunctive relief, the 
Supreme Court noted that it had implied, equitable powers “to provide 
complete relief in the light of the statutory purposes.”228  As a result, the Court 
explicitly took a purposivist position and held that an award of back pay was 
proper even though the statute did not expressly authorize it.229  Twelve years 
later, the Court interpreted the National Labor Relations Act in a similar 
manner in NLRB v. Scrivener, where it held that employees who gave sworn 
statements to the NLRB field examiner were protected from retaliation, even 
though the law only considered protection to those employees who filed formal 
charges or testified at a formal hearing.230  The Court again applied a 
purposivist interpretation of the law as Moberly noted that “[l]imiting the 
statute’s protections to a narrow reading of the provision’s text . . . would 
undermine the [law’s] purpose of encouraging ‘all persons with information 
about [unfair labor] practices to be completely free from coercion against 
reporting them to the Board.’”231  Finally, the cases of Brock v. Roadway 
Express, Inc.232 and Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.233 are two of the 
clearest examples in which the Court adhered to the anti-retaliation principle.  
In the former case, the Court upheld the Surface Transportation Assistance Act 
of 1982, which permitted an administrative agency to temporarily reinstate a 
fired whistleblower because “the eventual recovery of backpay may not alone 
provide sufficient protection to encourage reports of safety violations.”234  The 
Court explained that this was crucial since “Congress recognized that 
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employees in the transportation industry are often best able to detect safety 
violations and yet, because they may be threatened with discharge for 
cooperating with enforcement agencies, they need express protection against 
retaliation for reporting these violations.”235  Again, the Court was of the 
position that the law would not be properly enforced unless whistleblowers 
were given adequate protection.  Meanwhile, in Sullivan, the Court dealt with 
42 U.S.C. § 1982, which states that “[a]ll citizens of the United States shall 
have the same right . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . to inherit, purchase, 
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.”236  In that case, the 
Court “upheld a retaliation claim by a white landowner who was retaliated 
against for leasing a house to a black man.”237  The Court went out of its way 
to imply a cause of action for retaliation even though 42 U.S.C. § 1982 did not 
contain any retaliation language whatsoever.238  It stated that “[t]he existence 
of a statutory right implies the existence of all necessary and appropriate 
remedies.”239  Moreover, the Court noted that if the landowner was punished 
for trying to vindicate the rights of minorities, then “[s]uch a sanction would 
give impetus to the perpetuation of racial restrictions on property.”240 
These cases repeatedly display the Court’s belief that protecting employees 
from retaliation is necessary to ensure that these laws are properly enforced.241  
As previously noted, Justice O’Connor echoed this sentiment in Inter-Modal 
when she noted that Section 510 “helps to make [an employer’s] promises 
[under ERISA] credible.”242  In other words, if an employee does not feel free 
to report a violation of the law, then the “promises” that the law stood for are 
illusory because they will not be effectively enforced. 
The anti-retaliation principle endures today and continues to explain why 
the current Court, which is generally pro-employer, takes a softer stance 
towards employees when confronted with a retaliation case.  This is best 
exemplified by the cases of Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. 
White,243 Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education,244 and Crawford v. 
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee.245  In 
Burlington, an employee of the defendant railroad brought suit under Title VII 
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alleging that she was retaliated against under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) for filing 
a gender discrimination complaint with the EEOC.246  This statute forbids 
employer actions that “discriminate against” an employee (or job applicant) 
because he has “opposed” a practice that Title VII forbids or has “made a 
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in” a Title VII “investigation, 
proceeding, or hearing.”247  The Court, in a unanimous opinion, ruled in favor 
of the employee and held that the application of the statute should not be 
limited to an employer’s “conduct that ‘affects the employee’s compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.’”248  As with Mitchell, 
Scrivener, Brock, and Sullivan, the Court once again rested its conclusion on a 
purposivist interpretation of the statute.249  The Court stated that “a limited 
construction would fail to fully achieve the antiretaliation provision’s ‘primary 
purpose,’ namely, ‘[m]aintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial 
mechanisms.’”250  Therefore, in order to truly protect an employee from 
retaliation and encourage him to come forward and report a violation of the 
statute, the Court interpreted the statute broadly to protect an employee from 
retaliation in the form of gender discrimination even though it could not be 
described as a “workplace-related or employment-related retaliatory act[].”251 
Meanwhile in Jackson, a high school basketball coach sued the 
Birmingham Board of Education alleging that they retaliated against him in 
violation of Title IX for complaining about gender discrimination in the 
school’s athletic program.252  In that case, the Court went out of its way to 
disagree with the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which held that Title IX 
did not create a private right of action for retaliation because the language of 
the statute lacked a specific provision prohibiting retaliation.253  Instead, the 
Court implied a claim for retaliation under Title IX claiming that 
“[d]iscrimination” included a “wide range of intentional unequal treatment.”254  
As Moberly notes, “retaliation is discrimination ‘“on the basis of sex” because 
it is an intentional response to the nature of the complaint.’”255  As a result, the 
Court was able to construe the statute to protect individuals from retaliation 
even though it was silent on the matter. 
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Finally, in Crawford, an employee who participated in her employer’s 
internal investigation of a sexual harassment complaint was denied protection 
under Title VII’s retaliation provision by the Sixth Circuit, which held the 
“opposition clause” required “active, consistent, ‘opposing’ activities to 
warrant . . . protection against retaliation.”256  While the Sixth Circuit did not 
believe answering questions as part of an investigation qualified as “opposing,” 
the Supreme Court reversed on appeal noting that “‘[o]ppose’ goes beyond 
‘active, consistent’ behavior in ordinary discourse.” 257  The Court therefore 
rejected the more stringent definition of “oppose” which required “active” and 
“consistent” opposition because it was too constrictive.258  The Court stated 
that: 
There is, then, no reason to doubt that a person can “oppose” by responding to 
someone else’s question just as surely as by provoking the discussion, and 
nothing in the statute requires a freakish rule protecting an employee who 
reports discrimination on her own initiative but not one who reports the same 
discrimination in the same words when her boss asks a question.259 
According to the Court, the purpose of the retaliation provision was “to protect 
any form of communication to the employer in which the employee 
communicates [his or her] belief that the employer has violated Title VII” and 
offering protection only to those employees who initiated a complaint on their 
own would violate the spirit of the law.260  Thus, Crawford is apposite because 
it mirrors the dispute concerning Section 510 in that the Court noted it would 
be “freakish” if the rule protected an “employee who reports discrimination on 
her own initiative but not one who reports the same discrimination in the same 
words when her boss asks a question.”261  This is the reverse of the Section 510 
dispute in which courts have held an employee is not protected when coming 
forward on his own initiative but is protected when his complaints are 
solicited.262  Thus, it is quite likely that the Court will find the decisions of the 
Fifth and Ninth Circuits as creating a “freakish rule” as well. 
Furthermore, the Court has continued its adherence to the anti-retaliation 
principle in the recently decided case of Thompson v. North American 
Stainless, LP.263  The petitioner alleged that he was fired because his fiancé 
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engaged in protected activity under Title VII’s retaliation provision.264  The 
decision, authored by Justice Scalia no less, held that “Title VII prohibits 
retaliation against an employee by ‘inflicting reprisals’ on a third-party who is 
closely related to the employee.”265  Scalia acknowledged that Title VII’s anti-
retaliation provision had previously been interpreted broadly in Burlington and 
that it is “obvious that a reasonable worker might be dissuaded from engaging 
in protected activity if she knew that her fiance [sic] would be fired.”266  
Though the Court does not explicitly acknowledge the “anti-retaliation 
principle” like it has in some of its past jurisprudence, it appears that the 
Court’s adherence to it continues. 
As a result, the simple assumption that the pro-employer Roberts Court 
would automatically be hostile to a broad interpretation of ERISA Section 510 
is incorrect.  This point is brought home by the fact that the Court’s leading 
textualist even acknowledges that anti-retaliation statutes must be interpreted 
broadly.267  For over fifty years, the Court has repeatedly shown that it believes 
protecting whistleblowers from retaliation is crucial in upholding the nation’s 
laws. 268  As we have seen, from Mitchell through the Roberts Court’s recent 
decisions in Burlington, Jackson, and Crawford, the Court has abandoned 
textualist interpretations in favor of a purposivist approach that places the 
legislative purpose of the law above the plain meaning of the text.  While this 
seems hard to fathom for a court regarded as very conservative and textualist, 
the proof is in its decisions.  In both Burlington and Thompson, the Court 
unanimously held that Title VII must be interpreted broadly to effectively 
prevent against retaliation.269  When one analyzes the Court’s decisions in 
terms of strong law enforcement, it no longer seems inherently contradictory 
for a Court known as pro-employer to reverse course and protect the employee 
in these cases.  The Court clearly recognizes the importance of the 
whistleblower in American society and, quite simply, promotion of the anti-
retaliation principle is the best way to ensure that these individuals will 
continue to come forward and help ensure that rule of law is properly enforced. 
As a result, the Court should affirm the decisions of the Fifth and Ninth 
Circuits and hold that Section 510 of ERISA protects unsolicited internal 
complaints.  The Court has already demonstrated in Burlington, Jackson, 
Crawford, and now Thompson that they are willing to interpret a statute 
broadly, if necessary, when the situation warrants it.  More importantly, the 
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Court can find solid precedent upon which to rest this conclusion.  In 
Scrivener, for example, the Court provided whistleblower protection to 
employees who gave sworn statements to the NLRB, even though the law only 
considered protection to those employees who filed formal charges or testified 
at a formal hearing.270  Moreover, in Crawford the Court believed that simply 
answering questions regarding possible Title VII violations by an employer 
warranted protection against retaliation.271  The Court clearly had no problem 
reading these statutes in far broader terms than the plain meaning suggested, 
and the Court should do the same here.  Nevertheless, this does not guarantee 
that the Court will actually rule this way in regard to Section 510.  Ultimately, 
Section 510 is far narrower than Title VII.  For example, it does not protect an 
employee who simply “opposes” a practice.272  As a result, it may be too 
difficult for the Court’s textualists to construe it so broadly.  Additionally, 
because the Court’s retaliation jurisprudence does not deal with ERISA at all, 
it is difficult to predict exactly how they might rule.  Nevertheless, anything 
less than a broad purposivist interpretation of the statue would eviscerate the 
protections of the statute, and as Justice O’Connor wrote in Inter-Modal, 
would fail to “make [an employer’s] promises [under ERISA] credible.”273  
Moreover, it is the only way to ensure that whistleblowers who play a key role 
in enforcing the nation’s laws will continue to come forward and report 
possible violations. 
CONCLUSION 
The importance of Section 510 cannot be overstated.  With millions of 
Americans participating in pension and welfare programs that are governed by 
ERISA,274 a strong retaliation provision is necessary to ensure that the law as a 
whole functions properly.  As the Supreme Court noted, ‘‘Congress included 
various safeguards to preclude abuse.”275  Section 510 is perhaps the most 
important because “without it, employers would be able to circumvent the 
provision of promised benefits.”276  While Section 510 is decidedly narrower 
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than its counterparts in Title VII and FLSA, it does not mean that 
whistleblowers are not protected under it.  With an almost even circuit split, 
the Supreme Court should make the final determination once and for all.  
Through a purposivist interpretation in which the Court considers the 
overarching purpose of the provision, the Court should ensure that Section 510 
protects unsolicited internal complaints.  This is not an argument endorsing 
purposivism as the best or only manner of statutory interpretation.  It is simply 
the most suitable way in which the Court can give real teeth to Section 510 and 
make up for Congress’s failings when it drafted a law that disregarded an 
entire class of employees.  Thus, purposivism is the mechanism by which the 
“whistleblower” provision, as it is colloquially known, can actually be 
construed to protect whistleblowers. 
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